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ABSTRACT—While America's criminal justice system is deeply rooted in
the ideal of a popular morality play, it has long since drifted into becoming
a bureaucratic plea bargaining machine. We cannot (and would not want
to) return to the Colonial Era. Even so, there is much more we can do to
reclaim our heritage and incorporate popular participation within our
lawyer-run system. That requires pushing back against the relentless
pressures toward efficiency and maximizing quantity, to ensure that
criminal justice treats each criminal with justice, as a human and not just a
number. The criminal justice system must narrow its ambitions and scope,
counteract professionals’ tunnel vision, make punishment more productive,
and make criminal procedure more transparent and participatory. This
Essay ends by gesturing towards how the United States might start to tackle
these kinds of reforms.
AUTHOR—Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to
Rick Bierschbach, Joshua Kleinfeld, and the Northwestern University Law
Review for organizing this terrific Symposium.
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INTRODUCTION
The roots of America’s criminal justice system are deeply populist and
moral. In the colonies, the whole community participated in doing justice.
Criminal justice was an essential part of democratic self-government: it
taught lessons, expressed outrage, healed social and psychic wounds, and
empowered victims, defendants, jurors, and the public. In other words, it
was a communal morality play.1
Over the course of four centuries, professionals have displaced this
democratic morality play with a bureaucratic plea bargaining machine.
Lawyers speak for and silence parties, judges have developed rules too
technical for laymen to navigate or understand, plea bargains bypass juries,
and prisons hide punishment. Plea bargaining is a hidden and often skewed
process, in which non-merits factors such as wealth, bail, risk aversion, and
attorney skill loom large.2 The public may see plea bargaining as
cheapening and hiding justice.3
America cannot return to the Colonial Era; the plea bargaining
assembly line is here to stay. Even so, we can do much more to reclaim our
heritage and incorporate popular participation even within our lawyer-run
system.
The most fundamental problem with bureaucratic criminal justice is
that it has lost sight of why and how We the People should punish.
Bureaucratization breeds an intense concern for efficiency, measured
quantitatively as the number of arrests, charges, and convictions.4 That is a
recipe for “mass incarceration,” not moral judgment or public safety. The

1

STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2012).
See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer
Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1153–58 (2011).
3
BIBAS, supra note 1, at 51, 196 n.49.
4
See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1139 (2008) (“The traditional
conception of prosecutors as sentence-maximizers . . . recognizes that efficiency . . . is the chief
justification for plea bargaining. Prosecutors craft pleas to ensure the greatest number of convictions,
with each conviction garnering the highest possible sentence.” (footnote omitted)).
2
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citizens whom the bureaucracy is supposed to serve, by contrast, care about
more qualitative goals too: not only maximizing deterrence and
incapacitation, but also tailoring punishment to individual retributive desert
and exploring prospects for reform. And laymen care more than criminal
justice professionals about process values, such as having their day in court
and being treated fairly and respectfully.5 So the bureaucratic reality
neglects the public’s ideals. Criminal justice could do much more to treat
each criminal with justice, as a human and not just a number.
I.

THE MORAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

In the legal academy, there is a marked disconnect between
scholarship on substantive criminal law and scholarship on criminal
procedure. While criminal law often begins with reflecting on retribution
and rehabilitation, criminal procedure all but ignores such moral and
philosophical issues. And neither field steps back to first principles, to ask
when and how a democracy should punish as a matter of political theory,
with the consent of the governed.
Police and prosecutors are agents of the American people. They
punish in the name of We the People: criminal cases are captioned People
of the State of X v. David Defendant, not The King or Director of Public
Prosecutions v. David Defendant. A crime is a public wrong against the
entire community affected by the crime. And while the victim has a stake
in the crime, the particular police officer, prosecutor, or judge does not and
is merely an agent of the people. The agent should faithfully serve the
principals’ interests and deepest values, but often does not.
In colonial America, however, there was no principal–agent
disconnect because there were few if any agents. The people not only saw
justice done but did justice themselves. Victims typically prosecuted their
own cases pro se, telling their own stories. Defendants likewise defended
themselves pro se, challenging victims’ accounts by offering their own, or
pleading for mercy. Trials were thus shouting matches, telling dueling
stories in simple terms. Judges refereed these shouting matches, offered
their own views, and recommended mercy in appropriate cases. In most
colonies, laymen sat in judgment both on juries and in the town square
during public punishment.6
5

See generally Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for
“Process Values,” 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3, 20–27 (1974) (discussing and cataloguing criminal justice
“process values”).
6
See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 3–6, 9–11; GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 19, 246 n.1 (2003) (noting that Middlesex County,
Massachusetts did not receive its first county prosecutor until 1807); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE
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The jury trial and ensuing punishment were a morality play: a form of
educational social theater.7 Trial and punishment were didactic, teaching
and reinforcing citizens’ understandings of right and wrong.8 They were
expressive, condemning the guilty and vindicating victims or innocent
defendants. They were cathartic, purging the criminal’s debt to society and
to his victims. And they were restorative, paving the way for remorse,
apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation.9
Sanctions were very public but very temporary.10 American criminal
justice was in many ways less bloody than the English system; the death
penalty and disfiguring punishments were infrequently imposed and even
less often carried out.11 Fines and shaming were probably most common, as
well as restitution, though whipping and other corporal punishments were
used too.12 Once wrongdoers had paid their debts to society and victims,
they were forgiven and welcomed back—there was no permanent
underclass of ex-cons.13
Lay involvement and control were crucial to colonial criminal
justice’s efficacy. Crimes were defined by the common law, not a technical
penal code, and were mala in se. They accorded with widely shared
intuitions about justice and punishment, giving potential violators ample
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880, at 38 (1989) (“During the first
half of the nineteenth century, private prosecution dominated criminal justice in Philadelphia. . . .
[M]ost criminal prosecutions were initiated by private citizens.”); see also JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE
ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 11–16 (2003) (describing eighteenth-century English
criminal trials, which were procedurally similar to early colonial criminal trials).
7
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 25 (1993) (“[The
trial] was a public, open affirmation of the rules and their enforcement; a kind of divine social
theater.”).
8
See id.
9
See id. at 37, 39–40.
10
See id. at 37–41.
11
See id. at 41 (“By the standards of the times, and by English standards, the colonies were far
from bloody.”); id. at 41–44 (noting that it was extremely rare to hang colonial convicts for burglary,
robbery, or theft, and that each year, on average, the colony of Pennsylvania convicted fewer than two
defendants of capital crimes and executed only about one). See generally STUART BANNER, THE DEATH
PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 6–8, 65–68 (2002) (giving a brief history of the death penalty and
its evolution in the colonies and England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and noting that the
northern colonies were more sparing in authorizing the death penalty for violent and property crimes
and in practice rarely executed convicts for morals offenses).
12
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 37–41 (discussing common methods of punishing criminals in
the colonies).
13
WILLIAM M. OFFUTT, JR., OF “GOOD LAWS” AND “GOOD MEN”: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE
DELAWARE VALLEY, 1680–1710, at 186–91 (1995) (presenting empirical evidence of criminal-offender
reintegration in the colonies in the Delaware Valley (now Pennsylvania and New Jersey)); Eli Faber,
Puritan Criminals: The Economic, Social, and Intellectual Background to Crime in SeventeenthCentury Massachusetts, in 11 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 83, 137–44 (Donald Fleming ed.,
1978) (describing criminal-offender reintegration in Puritan Massachusetts).
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notice. Those intuitions, rooted in Christian faith, emphasized that each of
us is sinful, fallen; there but for the grace of God go we. All classes, not
just the poor, fell afoul of the law. But Christian optimism tempered the
colonists’ pessimism. That same faith saw in each defendant the image and
likeness of God, seeking to condemn the wrong while loving and
welcoming back the prodigal son. Thus, the system respected every
participant’s intrinsic moral worth and dignity.14
Trials were likewise commonsense matters of hearing each side’s
story and assigning not only factual and legal but also moral blame. That
meant they were simultaneously backward- and forward-looking,
adjudicating the past with an eye toward the future. Juries often selected
among multiple possible gradations of offenses, tailoring their convictions
to the particular defendant’s culpability and equities. Judges and juries
could thus show mercy or recommend clemency in proportion to each
defendant’s fault, dangerousness, and amends.15
The entire criminal process was transparent and participatory.
Transparency and participation kept the substance of criminal law,
enforcement, and punishment in accord with popular morality.
Procedurally, transparency and participation empowered victims,
defendants, and citizens. Everyone had his day in court, told his story, and
saw justice done by doing it himself. Aggrieved or innocent parties were
vindicated, and guilty parties condemned, in the public eye. Participation
empowered victims and citizens, counteracting many victims’ feelings of
powerlessness.
The roots of American criminal justice embody the thought of Emile
Durkheim and Alexis de Tocqueville. In his Division of Labor in Society,
Durkheim wrote that reforming defendants and deterring imitators are only
incidental benefits of criminal justice; its core function is to reinforce
society’s solidarity.16 When a criminal transgresses the criminal law,
society must denounce the wrong and punish the wrongdoer to reinforce its
basic moral norms.17 In Durkheim’s words, “[w]ithout this necessary act of
satisfaction[,] what is called the moral consciousness cannot be

14

BIBAS, supra note 1, at 2–3, 11–12. The biblical reference is to the Parable of the Prodigal Son,
found at Luke 15:11–32. In that parable, the prodigal son stands ready to admit his profligacy and to say
that he deserves to be treated as a servant, not a son. But as soon as the father sees his son from a great
distance, he has compassion, runs to kiss him, and rejoices over his return to life.
15
BIBAS, supra note 1, at 7–9.
16
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 62–63 (W. D. Halls trans., The Free
Press 1984) (1893).
17
Id. at 63.

1681

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

preserved. . . . [Punishment] serves to heal the wounds inflicted upon the
collective sentiments . . . .”18
Durkheim’s social solidarity helped to sustain the democratic selfgovernment praised by Tocqueville.19 The colonists’ commonsensical
system was a living, functioning part of democratic self-government.
Citizens took turns serving on grand and petit juries, seeing first-hand
justice in practice and so educating themselves and their neighbors. They
applied the law to the facts and equities of particular cases, balancing
freedom and security, justice and mercy. There were few if any technical
rules of procedure or evidence to obscure or obstruct public understanding
and moral judgment.20 And there were plenty of lay checks upon official
overreaching, ranging from tort liability for overzealous searches to grand
jury presentments for official malfeasance.21
To be fair, the social conditions of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and
eighteenth centuries were far more conducive to running criminal justice as
a morality play. The colonies were small, close-knit communities—“tight
little islands” in Lawrence Friedman’s phrase.22 They were very religiously
and ethnically homogeneous, and much less diverse in race, education, and
wealth.23 (Where there were slaves and other minorities, they suffered
second-class justice or worse.) People were much less mobile. State and
government apparatus were much less developed, and there was far less
professionalization.24 There were no law schools or even indigenous law
books in the English colonies, and there were no professional police
forces.25 And the lack of professional governmental apparatus carried
substantial costs. For instance, night watchmen, constables, and other
untrained volunteers and conscripts were hardly a match for dangerous
professional criminals.26
18

Id.
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 442–50 (Eduardo Nolla ed., James T.
Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund 2012) (1835) (discussing the role of the jury in self-governance).
20
BIBAS, supra note 1, at 4–6.
21
See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 786–87
(1994) (tort liability); Renée B. Lettow, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 YALE L.J.
1333, 1354–56 (1994) (grand jury presentments).
22
FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 17.
23
See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 14. Conversely, these generalizations were probably less true of
larger, more urban, more heterogeneous colonies such as New York.
24
BIBAS, supra note 1, at 3, 14.
25
WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 2 (1975) (discussing the absence of indigenous
law books in the colonies); FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 27–29, 67 (discussing the absence of
professional police forces).
26
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 28.
19
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Nevertheless, the colonists had something we lack today: a
participatory, democratic justice system, attuned to local needs and moral
intuitions. The next Part explores how professionalization came at the cost
of democracy, as efficiency supplanted morality.
II.

PROFESSIONALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

After the American Revolution, lawyers steadily displaced lay
participation in criminal justice. Over the course of the nineteenth century,
public prosecutors displaced victims. Then, defense lawyers increasingly
represented defendants, speaking for and silencing their clients. Prosecutors
and defenders were of course lawyers, agents of the public or defendants.
That meant they lacked a personal stake in convictions and sentences, let
alone in each side’s having its day in court.27
As agents, they did have interests in clearing their own dockets,
minimizing their workloads, and avoiding the expense and possible
embarrassment of losing at trial. Judges share most of these interests as
well. So prosecutors, defense lawyers, and soon judges began to cooperate
to trade less severe punishments for certain convictions. This was the rise
of plea bargaining, which manipulated charges, convictions, and sentences
outside the public’s view.28
From a Weberian bureaucratic perspective, plea bargaining makes
perfect sense. Repeat players soon learn the value of recurring cases,
developing a market with going rates and standardized terms. Risk-averse
parties can cap their exposure and avoid worst-case outcomes as well as
expense and delay.29 The judge and lawyers clear their dockets and move
the business, following the bureaucratic imperative to process cases quickly
and cheaply. By saving the cost and drama of adversarial combat, plea
bargaining makes each of the criminal justice insiders better off.30
Moreover, if one defines criminal justice’s aims narrowly as just
efficient case processing, plea bargaining seems to make the system work

27

BIBAS, supra note 1, at 16.
See FISHER, supra note 6, at 62–90, 121–24, 129–36 (discussing prosecutors’ use of dismissals,
early probation, and later sentence recommendations as plea bargaining tools to lighten prosecutors’
and judges’ busy dockets, particularly once the Industrial Revolution clogged courts with tort suits).
29
See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 32; MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF
PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 110–14 (1978) (explaining pressures on prosecutors
to engage in plea bargaining).
30
BIBAS, supra note 1, at 32–33; see HEUMANN, supra note 29, at 66, 144–48, 156–57 (1978);
Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367, 1379–82
(2017).
28
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better too.31 The system as a whole maximizes speed and quantity,
optimizing general deterrence (as well as incapacitation).32 In an
overwhelmed world of too much crime, the plea bargaining assembly line
eventually seems to be the best that we can do.
When one removes these blinders, however, efficiency looks very
costly. First, professionalization entails very substantial agency costs.
Prosecutors and defense lawyers have substantial interests in reducing their
own workloads and minimizing the chance of embarrassing defeats at trial.
None of these actors feels his client’s pain. That can rein in excessive
vengefulness, but it can also soften the vigorous adversarial combat that is
supposed to elicit the truth.
Second, the punishment assembly line loses sight of the purpose of
punishment. The overriding objective is to do what it takes to get a
conviction and get the case off the prosecutor’s plate. That means that
prosecutors make offers defendants cannot refuse, using whatever leverage
they have to induce guilty pleas. These punishment threats and
inducements rarely reflect retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or reform.
They are simply instrumental tools to induce pleas. And their instrumental
value comes precisely in bypassing the morality play for which many
victims and citizens thirst.33
Punishment markets are amoral, divorced from punishment principles
and only indirectly concerned with factual guilt. Non-merits factors such as
defense counsel overwork, underfunding, and pretrial detention often drive
bargains. Psychological biases and heuristics like overoptimism,
discounting, framing, anchoring, risk aversion, and loss aversion skew
punishments too.34
Third, bureaucratic efficiency is at odds with checking governmental
power. The Framers were deeply suspicious of state actors abusing criminal
punishment. They built in democratic checks and balances such as grand
and petit juries, sacrificing efficiency for public accountability.35 But plea
bargaining’s efficiency depends upon bypassing or subverting these checks
and balances. The result is concentrated power, empowering prosecutors to
31

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1978 (1992)
(“Plea bargains are compromises. Autonomy and efficiency support them.”).
32
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289,
296–300 (1983) (discussing plea bargaining as a means of maximizing general deterrence).
33
See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 39–40 (describing how the process values of outsiders to the criminal
justice system differ from those of insiders).
34
See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2530, 2496–519 (2004).
35
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1182–85
(1991).
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exercise much hidden discretion with little accountability. Criminal justice
professionals are thus insulated from meaningful oversight.36
Fourth, insulation from the public breeds suspicion. Criminal justice
depends on its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. When it comes to seem
unconcerned with justice, criminal justice loses its claim upon citizens’
voluntary cooperation. They are less likely to comply voluntarily with the
law when no one is looking, and less willing to report crimes or otherwise
cooperate with police and prosecutors.37 This problem is akin to the Stop
Snitching Movement and widespread protests against police shootings:
large segments of the public no longer feel that law enforcement is on their
side.38 Moreover, poor people are disproportionately arrested and charged,
and they suffer most from inadequate funding of indigent defense counsel.39
These disparities exacerbate poor people’s disadvantage and distrust of the
system.
Fifth, in exalting quantity über alles, our system degrades the quality
of criminal justice. The system seems callous, inhumane, deaf to the
emotional and psychological needs of victims, defendants, and the public.
Victims feel victimized again, disempowered, shut out, and silenced.
People feel treated as fungible widgets to be hurried along the plea
bargaining assembly line, not humans who have stories to tell and need a
sympathetic ear.
Finally, speeding defendants along to prison treats them as less than
human. Punishment is now little more than warehousing outcasts in internal
exile. There is no serious effort to reform or rehabilitate them. Instead, their
prolonged isolation and criminal records brand them as a permanent caste
of ex-cons. Though America once embraced wrongdoers as errant brethren
36

BIBAS, supra note 1, at 52.
Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 949–51 (2006).
38
Patrice Morris & Vivian Pacheco, Stop Snitching Campaign, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE AND
CRIME 773, 773 (Helen Taylor Greene & Shaun L. Gabbidon eds., 2009); see Bibas, supra note 37, at
951 (“Perhaps because of these factors, nearly three-quarters of Americans lack much confidence and
trust in the criminal justice system.” (citing Lydia Saad, Military Again Tops “Confidence in
Institutions” List, GALLUP POLL NEWS SERV. (June 1, 2005), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
16555/military-again-tops-confidence-institutions-list.aspx [https://perma.cc/2RD8-JKTA])).
39
See KAREN DOLAN & JODI L. CARR, INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, THE POOR GET PRISON: THE
ALARMING SPREAD OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 11 (2015), http://www.ips-dc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/IPS-The-Poor-Get-Prison-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR2E-Q2BS] (reporting
that each of the fifteen states with the largest prison populations “had a practice of arresting people
because they were unable to pay fines, fees, debts or because they did not attend hearings about these
debts”); A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN
PROMISE:
AMERICA’S
CONTINUING
QUEST
FOR
EQUAL
JUSTICE
7–14
(2004),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM87-8P5K].
37
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to be reclaimed, we now treat them as rabid dogs to be caged or as garbage
to be thrown away.
One would think that the philosophical aims of criminal punishment
would drive the procedures of criminal justice. But simplistic metrics of
efficiency have taken on a life of their own. In substance, we seek to
maximize the crudest measures of general deterrence and incapacitation by
promoting the greatest imprisonment for the greatest number. Retribution
filters into the system only in a truncated form, looking at the severity of
crimes and criminal records but neglecting intent, motive, and character.
There are pockets of treatment courts for juveniles and the lowest-level
nonviolent crimes, particularly for drug-addicted defendants. But
otherwise, reform and rehabilitation are all but absent from serious
consideration.
In recent years, activists and policymakers have finally paid some
attention to inequality of punishment, a consideration that is absent from
the punishment assembly line. Even so, when the system tries to promote
equality at all, in practice it focuses on mathematical equality of outcomes,
not moral equality sensitive to each defendant’s intent, background, reform,
and other justifications for punishment.40 Concern for victims and
procedural fairness are almost entirely eclipsed by this equality calculus.
The reign of quantity is a sign that the punishment machine has abdicated
popular moral judgment.41
III.

THE AMBITIONS AND LIMITS OF REFORMS

Confronted with the scale of the problem, one is sorely tempted to
“abandon every hope” upon entering here.42 Dynamiting the plea
bargaining edifice is futile. American criminal justice processes more than
a million felony cases per year and more than ten million misdemeanors,
not to mention many millions of traffic violations and tickets.43 Crime is a
40

See, e.g., Michelle S. Phelps & Devah Pager, Inequality and Punishment: A Turning Point for
Mass Incarceration?, 663 ANNALS ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 185, 196–97 (2016) (studying correlations
between states’ income inequalities and imprisonment rates, and between states’ racial composition and
imprisonment rates).
41
See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong with Sentencing Equality?,
102 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1459–62, 1469–74 (2016).
42
DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY VOLUME I: INFERNO 89 (Mark Musa trans., Penguin
Books 1984) (Canto III, l. 9).
43
SEAN ROSENMERKEL, MATTHEW DUROSE & DONALD FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 – STATISTICAL
TABLES 1 (2009), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf [https://perma.cc/77C9-63PY] (“In
2006, state courts sentenced an estimated 1,132,290 persons for a felony conviction.”); ROBERT C.
BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS,
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR
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perennial worry, and the mediating social institutions that restrained and
handled much of it have frayed, forcing increasing reliance on what used to
be the system of last resort.
Moreover, trial procedures have hypertrophied, making it too
cumbersome to try more than a fraction of cases. Much of this
overproceduralization has been constitutionalized, and much more is
entrenched in technical rules of evidence and procedure. Old habits die
hard, and it is difficult to imagine trying every case or declining to
prosecute 80% or more of crimes.
Caution is warranted, but despair is not. Reining in agency costs and
refocusing criminal justice on its moral ends and procedural values remain
imperative, even if these goals are ambitious and only partly achievable.
First, police and prosecutors have vast power that is now essentially
unchecked, thanks to the withering of grand juries, petit juries, and judicial
sentencing discretion. That unchecked discretion contrasts sharply with the
administrative state and its extensive apparatus of standards, notice and
comment, government in the sunshine requirements, and judicial review.44
In addition, American criminal justice runs largely on autopilot. The
goals it pursues reflexively diverge widely from the public’s intuitive sense
of justice. Paul Robinson and his coauthors’ scholarship has impressively
demonstrated how many common liability and punishment rules are greatly
at odds with survey respondents’ sense of deserved punishment.45 The same
is true of our plea and punishment procedures, which deny victims,
defendants, and members of the public their say and day in court.
Criminal justice is a subject about which the public has great concern.
Given its deeply moral content, the public is also unwilling to defer to
technical experts. Repeated efforts to insulate criminal justice from popular
input and opinion have backfired, as Rachel Barkow and others have
shown.46 Squelched and deprived of other outlets, eruptions of populist
COURTS 11 (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=20808
[https://perma.cc/A383-K2FC] (estimating that American courts handle roughly 10 million
misdemeanor cases per year).
44
Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976); see Rachel E.
Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1020–31, 1041–50 (2006)
(explaining the lack of administrative, judicial, and political oversight of police and prosecutors;
contrasting this with ample oversight present in other administrative spheres; and discussing the plea
bargaining consequences of such broad prosecutorial discretion).
45
See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1961–78 (2010).
46
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 798–800 (2005)
(“[A]gencies responsible for regulating criminal justice issues are under enormous political pressure,
regardless of their design. . . . [I]t is largely up to legislatures to determine how much influence
sentencing commissions will have, and features designed to promote independence are of little
consequence in this context.”).
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outrage only make things worse. Voters turn for instance to tools of direct
democracy such as initiatives and referenda, adopting bumper-sticker
slogans such as three-strikes laws and mandatory minima. Yet prosecutors
and other insiders routinely subvert these laws, turning them into more plea
bargaining chips and so further fueling popular outrage and learned
helplessness.47
The ultimate goal here is to refocus from quantity to quality. That
means first and foremost taking seriously the principle of parsimony.
Criminal stigma and punishment should as a rule be reserved for the most
serious mala in se. We need more triage mechanisms, to better sift out and
divert smaller and less blameworthy wrongs. Most wrongs should be
resolved civilly, administratively, or by arbitration, mediation, or diversion
accompanied by restitution and possible treatment.
Declination should become the norm for matters that are smaller, less
blameworthy, amenable to noncriminal resolution, or not readily provable
beyond a reasonable doubt. That would require more investigation up front
to vet the strength of the evidence and likely defenses, instead of trusting in
the ability to bargain away weaknesses later.48 One important benefit of
ferreting out and declining to prosecute weak cases is that it will
disproportionately benefit innocent defendants, clearing their names earlier
and preventing wrongful convictions.
This legal change requires an accompanying cultural change to the
American expectation that “there oughta be a law” or “there oughta be a
prosecution.” Many other societies use many other ways to mediate
conflicts and ensure restitution and apologies. The growing restorative
justice movement exemplifies these lessons.49 America’s litigious culture
could learn a lot from them.
Narrowing criminal justice’s ambitions will husband its stigma and its
resources, conserving its credibility. It will also allow for more thorough
and considerate procedures, better ensuring factual, legal, and moral
accuracy. Slowing cases down will allow more care, more caution, and
more thorough deliberation about guilt, blame, and the need to condemn
and punish. Judges should once again judge, not just rubber stamp.
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Finally, improving the quality of criminal justice means caring not
only about why and how much we punish but also how we get there.
Procedural justice means treating victims, defendants, and citizens as
stakeholders, not just nuisances or informational resources. It requires
soliciting their views and knowledge and listening to them fairly and
respectfully. Talking and listening in turn require time: it is hard for a
defense lawyer to build rapport and trust with a client if he has only five
minutes to speak with him in the holding cells outside the courtroom and
instantly presents him with a plea offer as a fait accompli. “Meet ‘em and
plead ‘em” lawyering must end. So must the most coercive punishment
threats, such as using the death penalty as a plea bargaining chip. Criminal
justice needs to tend to humans humanely—as people, not widgets or
statistics.
IV.

RETURNING SOME POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Any problem this gigantic and longstanding resists pat solutions in the
last few pages of a law review essay. That difficulty warrants caution, but
not despair. Some reforms are easier and less costly, especially in the short
term, while others are longer-term ambitions. This Part sketches out a
rough ladder of types of reform, from those that work within a
fundamentally professionalized system to those that transform it by
bringing in the public.
The first cluster of reforms seeks to change professionals’ perspective.
Prosecutors, police, and other professionals wear blinders, focusing
narrowly on maximizing quantity and speed and minimizing cost. Arrests,
charges, and conviction statistics dominate budgeting, promotion decisions,
and boasting.
A series of reforms could combat this professionalized tunnel vision.
Prosecutors’ offices could hire from a broader variety of backgrounds,
including former defense lawyers and victims’ advocates. Their training
could incorporate lay voices, psychological perspectives, and concern for
victims. Salary and promotion decisions could look beyond quantity to
reflect quality as well.50
To do all of this, we need better metrics of success. Right now, an
enormous amount rides on the crudest of measures: arrest, charge, and
conviction statistics. Quantity is obvious and easy to measure; quality is all
but absent. But police and prosecutors can take a page from businesses,
which have found many ways to measure quality. Customer satisfaction
50
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surveys, for instance, provide rich qualitative information about the
purchasing process as well as the product’s performance. More broadly,
360-degree feedback aggregates information from an employee’s
supervisor, subordinates, peers, and customers. Police and prosecutors’
offices could expand these email or automated telephone surveys to include
victims, defendants, witnesses, judges, and opposing counsel. Supervisors
could use this information in training and performance evaluations, to ferret
out not only legal violations, negligence, and abuses of power, but even
rudeness and thoughtlessness. More comprehensive, real-time feedback
would greatly reduce professionals’ agency costs, forcing agents to be far
more responsive to all their principals’ interests and needs. Serving the
interests of victims, defendants, and the public would be not just a gauzy
ideal, but a concrete, measurable standard.51
These steps would improve the principal–agent problem at the level of
line prosecutors, police, and judges. Improving accountability of head
prosecutors and police chiefs is a tougher nut to crack. Prosecutorial
elections are notoriously uncompetitive, driven by poor information,
particularly scandals or a handful of high-profile trials.52 Better metrics of
success could help somewhat. But, as David Schleicher and Elina Treyger
explain, local prosecutorial elections are afflicted by apathy and low
information, and that pathology is structural.53 Our best bet is probably to
put less faith in periodic elections and more in ongoing communitypolicing and community-prosecution meetings and partnerships.
A second cluster of reforms should try to make punishment more
productive, populist, and prosocial. Rather than spending years in idleness,
able-bodied prisoners should be able to work, earning pay, making
restitution, and developing marketable skills. One could even experiment
with allowing able-bodied inmates without serious violent tendencies to
enlist in the military, gradually earning the rank and privileges of ordinary
enlisted soldiers and sailors. Inmates should make restitution to victims and
support their own families, to the extent feasible. And this restitution
should include not only monetary compensation and help undoing physical
damage, but also expressions of remorse and apologies.54
A particularly thorny issue is the extent to which punishment should
incorporate shaming. On the one hand, shaming seems to involve the
51
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community, allowing it to denounce the wrong and see justice done. On the
other hand, shaming seems to unleash the worst passions of the mob,
objectifying and scapegoating the wrongdoer. One might productively
follow John Braithwaite in distinguishing reintegrative from disintegrative
shaming, favoring temporary shame followed by forgiveness and
reintegration.55 The goal is to make punishment more visible but also more
local and more temporary, so it is more accountable but also more
measured.
Third, reformers should strive to improve public oversight by making
American criminal justice more transparent. The public knows and sees
little of what police, lawyers, and judges actually do each day, so it can do
little to guide or rein them in. Investigative reporters could do much more
to research and publicize aggregate statistics as well as typical cases, not
just the sensational, atypical ones that grab headlines. Legislative oversight
hearings should likewise attend to everyday cases, not just exceptional
ones. Criminal court observers can assist, as could broadcasting court
proceedings and filming police interactions with citizens.56
But I am skeptical about using new media as a substitute for day-today democratic oversight and engagement. All too often, electronic media
elicit not reasoned deliberation but rather mob passions. It is simply hard, if
not impossible, to recreate bygone eras when everyone in a small town
knew everything about the criminal trial that was in their midst and
consumed all their attention. There is a huge difference between knowing
about individual cases at the retail level and hearing abstract statistics about
wholesale criminal justice patterns. By itself, transparency risks promoting
the latter without the former.
Even so, some oversight is better than none at all. Prosecutors,
currently accountable to almost no one in practice, will behave differently
if they have some awareness of being watched. Police ordinarily behave
differently when they know they are being filmed.57 The agency costs are
so large, and so unchecked, that more transparency cannot hurt.
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Fourth, reforms should strive to create more opportunities for the
public to participate in criminal justice. This is most feasible at the lowest
level of government, the neighborhood or police precinct: communitypolicing and community-prosecution meetings can explain priorities and
promote cooperation with neighborhood residents, while reciprocally
soliciting and listening to residents’ priorities.58
There are also ways to institutionalize participation within criminal
justice institutions. Citizen volunteers could rotate through police
departments and prosecutors’ offices, consulting on enforcement priorities.
Revived grand juries, or plea juries, could play more meaningful roles in
the most serious criminal cases. These juries could check prosecutorial
charging and bargaining decisions, especially the (ab)use of mandatory
minimum penalties.59
Jury-like bodies could also play roles after conviction. Restorative
sentencing juries could listen to victims’ and defendants’ stories and weigh
reasons and appropriate penalties, instead of being bound by prosecutors’
unilateral charging decisions. And citizen input into clemency, including
both pardon and commutation decisions, could revive a historic safety
valve that has fallen into disuse in the hands of nervous bureaucrats.60
CONCLUSION
America’s plea bargaining assembly line is far removed from its
colonial roots in a cathartic morality play. The modern amoral criminal
justice bureaucracy is cut off from the wellsprings of democratic legitimacy
and popular moral judgment. Rather than continuing to ignore or squelch
democratic input, we would do better to welcome it back in, tempering
efficient case processing with humane, equitable discretion. Insiders and
outsiders, lawyers and laymen, should once again cooperate, balancing
their perspectives as part of a broader morality play.
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